Kashmir imbroglio: A way out
by S D Pradhan
by S D Pradhan
07 September 2010, 04:27 PM IST
courtesy: http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ChanakyaCode/entry/kashmir-imbroglio-a-way-out
Notwithstanding reports projecting that the spurt in street violence since mid-June this year in several parts of the Valley has acquired dangerous proportions, that the protests represent a popular uprising and that the nature and intensity of the current agitation are different from the past, the situation is far from being nearly as desperate as is sometimes painted to be.
A careful analysis of various factors indicates that though the situation has deteriorated as compared to last year, yet many of the conclusions are misconceived and are influenced by the propaganda of separatists and Pakistan. The following factors in this context merit attention-
-The protests are confined to only some parts of the Valley. Well researched figures available in the media reveal that the violent protests have been witnessed in seven out of ten districts of the Valley and more frequent protests have been noted only in the four districts- Baramulla, Srinagar, Anantnag and Pulwama.
-A section of stone throwers is receiving money to participate in these protests to target the security force personnel. Intelligence reports also reveal that the protesters include a large number of those persons who have taken up stone pelting as a lucrative business. CM Omar Abdullah had noted in April, "The industry of stone pelting is very much on our radar. We have in fact been able to identify a couple of big business houses, one in particular which has used its networks of dealers to route the money through."
-These protests are being organized by separatist leaders at the behest of Pak ISI which had been preparing for this strategy since 2006. The calendar of protests is prepared and issued by the separatists. The adherence to these calls by common people is mainly because of the muscle power of the miniscule separatists and not because of their own conviction. For example, the Lassipora Industrial Estate in Pulwama and Rangreth Industrial Estate were not affected by the protests in the beginning but after the visit of terrorists, the situation changed.
-The cycle of violence suggests a set pattern indicating how carefully these protests are orchestrated. When the street rage begins to peter out in one area, protests erupt in some other region. Home Minister stated on August 4, 2010 that there was a reliable intelligence that at least one armed militant had mingled with the crowds and fired at the security forces. This suggests that the planners are deliberately creating situations in which the security forces are forced to fire.
-Some early signs of people in the Valley getting fed up with the growing number of calls for protests are now visible. On September 4, 2010 residents in Srinagar defied the call for protests and went about their business as usual. Shopkeepers and taxi drivers expressed that as they were suffering financially since mid June because of the frequent calls of protests, hence they decided to defy the separatists' strike call. Towards the end of August, scores of parents and students marched to Srinagar from Ganderbal district carrying placards to protest against the closure of schools and colleges. A leading school in Srinagar was forced to shift its class XII students to New Delhi to salvage their academic year.
Though the separatists' strategy and their Pak mentors' guidance and support form the main cause of the current crisis, yet they do not provide the complete picture. Much blame should also come to the Kashmiri politicians whose lackluster performance and vote bank politics have significantly contributed to the deterioration of the situation in the J&K. Bureaucracy too is responsible for generating frustration among the common people. Corruption is rampant and there is clearly absence of visible development. The officials are not seen as paying due attention to the grievance of residents. Elements of good governance are missing. This strengthens the perception that the administration in the State has collapsed.
The security forces too are not fully trained to deal with the situation that has arisen recently. The perception is growing that the security forces are not adhering to the principle of use of minimum force. Analysts have pointed out that the security forces are not adopting non lethal sophisticated methods for controlling the crowd. The continuing deaths in firings of the security forces strengthen this perception.
The National Conference, which obtained a sizable number of seats in the elections about two years ago, is fast losing its popularity. The PDP has been espousing the cause of separatists and is always looking for an opportunity to oust the present government. A deliberate effort is on to project that the present Chief Minister is not capable of handling the current crisis. Even those elements who are convinced of sincerity of Omar Abdullah, feel that he lacks maturity to deal with the opportunist political leaders in J&K. If violence continues, the ruling government would find it difficult to continue.
The moot question is how to deal with the current cycle of violence.
SAS Geelani has stated that Kashmiris desire only azadi and nothing less than secession of J&K from India would satisfy them. This is not correct as majority of residents of the State do not desire this. It is wrong to presume that all Muslims of the State want azadi. The younger elements are not clear about the concept of azadi as was clear from their interaction with some politicians that was reported in the media. The political leaders both in J&K and in New Delhi stress the need for political solution and to start a dialogue with the separatists. PM has come out with the employment and economic development package. While these are to some extent needed, the policy makers need to accurately assess the causes behind the current violence and protests and the changing nature of demands to undertake appropriate steps to restore normalcy.
The immediate causes should be given priority rather than the long term measures. The present unrest stems out of the perception of "deliberate killings" in the police firings. This has allowed the separatists and the Pak agencies to create a perception that the present regime is supporting the security personnel who are indulging in ruthless human rights violations. Therefore as the first step the perception that the Government tends to bat for the errant elements in the security forces and not for the people of J&K needs to be removed by ordering a probe in all such cases. A judicial commission should be established at the earliest for this purpose. This may certainly adversely affect the morale of the security forces but this would go a long way to satisfy the protesters. The Government must make it clear that the guilty would be suitably punished. The investigations may expose the manipulations by the separatists, which could nullify the allegations against the security forces. Alongside, a mechanism for prompt and satisfactory attention to the complaints of excessive use of force or violation of human rights should be established. There is a feeling among the residents of J&K that there is no effective mechanism to pay attention to their grievances.
The second step should be aimed at starting an interaction with the young men who are involved in the agitation. There has been a lot of pressure to start a dialogue with the separatists. This should be avoided in the present circumstances as under the shadow of protests and continuing violence, it is not likely to succeed. The Government should immediately appoint an interlocutor to start the process of interaction with the agitating youth. The person for this job should be carefully selected. It may be better to appoint a politician who understands the problems of all the sections of J&K. Appointment of a retired bureaucrat should be avoided as they are seen as following the established line. The interlocutor should talk to all sections. The migrants from the Valley should also be consulted and all efforts should be made to bring them back to the Valley.
The third step should be to put in place sophisticated methods of crowd control and avoid the use of lethal weapons. The security forces should keep in mind that increasing number of incidents of killings would make the situation intractable. They should also ensure that no one is ill treated. The PM has already stressed the need for non lethal mechanisms of crowd control. This would also require suitable training of security forces in such methods. The security forces must realize that in situations like this, the emphasis should be on winning over "hearts and minds of the people". Their involvement in providing necessary medical and educational facilities to people particularly in difficult areas would go a long way in earning of their goodwill. The rotation of units of security forces at suitable intervals is also necessary to ensure that the fatigue factor does not adversely affect their decision making capabilities.
The fourth step that the Central Government should take is to energize the Task Force for Psychological Campaign to counter the malicious propaganda of the separatists and the Pak agencies. This was established under the Home Secretary by the Group of Ministers in 2001. However it seldom meets. This should meet at regular intervals to provide necessary guidance to the concerned agencies. This institution can play a significant role in removing the wrong perceptions and media management, which are crucial at this juncture. India has so far been silent as far as the happenings in PoK are concerned. Despite the fact that this area belongs to India, there has been no systematic effort made to project our concerns over denial of democratic rights to people there and deliberate change in the demography of the region by Pakistan that adversely affects the local people. If these facts are brought to the notice of the people in J&K, they would be able to clearly see the game plan of Pakistan. The fact that PoK is ruled like a colony of Pakistan needs to be placed before the people. The residents in Gilgit-Baltistan are already revolting against the Pak governance policy and it is India's moral obligation to support the "freedom fighters" there.
The Hurriyat leaders are not the real leaders of the people of J&K. They have not faced elections. Of course their ability to create mischief is high, which is because of the support of terrorists and not because of their wide spread support. Therefore, they should be treated accordingly. Media has over projected the "willingness" of Geelani to support the dialogue process. He has placed his five pre conditions for talks which only support the Pak line. Any temptation to have a dialogue with the separatists should be avoided with these preconditions though this may receive a pat from the international community. Any dialogue under the shadow of protests and violence is unlikely to yield the desired results.
The political leaders should improve their performance. They must realize that if their performance remains unsatisfactory, people are bound to express their resentment against them. Most of the political leaders have stopped addressing rallies in the Valley since mid-June. The governance needs to be improved significantly. The official machinery should be sensitive to the problems of the people. It may be recalled that in 2006 in the Round Table Conference, the PM had announced people centric initiatives which had positive impact. Their implementation in letter and spirit needs to be pursued.
The proposal to lift the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act should be taken after considering all the facts. This should not be done merely to placate the protesters. While the removal of this Act has become one of the demands of the protesters, it must be recognized that the current anger of the protesters is primarily against the deaths in the firings on the protesters. The infiltration continues and reports suggest that a sizeable number of foreign terrorists are present in J&K. The likely repercussions of the removal of the Act should be accurately assessed. Similarly the impact of reduction of the security forces should be analyzed in the light of the developing situation. However, the relocation of the security pickets in the civilian areas can be undertaken.
The larger question of political initiatives to satisfy the aspirations of the people of J&K should be seen in the wider context of Centre-State Relations. There are several other states which are governed by Special Acts like J&K. If J&K has Art 370, Nagaland has Art.371-A, Assam has Art 371-B, Manipur has Art-371-C, Andhra Pradesh has Art 371-D and there are special provisions for Sikkim, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh and Goa as well. If some concessions are to be given to J&K, similar demands would be made by other States. The Centre- State Commission has dealt with all such aspects in its report. Its recommendations need to be examined for implementation. The need for devolution of power to the lowest administrative unit is certainly desirable. The aspirations of people would be satisfied if they are involved in the decision making bodies at the local levels. This should be done in all the States.
It is necessary to note that there is no quick political solution for the problem. Indian policy makers should not take any political measure in a hurry that would create serious problems for our successive generations.
courtesy: http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ChanakyaCode/entry/kashmir-imbroglio-a-way-out
Notwithstanding reports projecting that the spurt in street violence since mid-June this year in several parts of the Valley has acquired dangerous proportions, that the protests represent a popular uprising and that the nature and intensity of the current agitation are different from the past, the situation is far from being nearly as desperate as is sometimes painted to be.
A careful analysis of various factors indicates that though the situation has deteriorated as compared to last year, yet many of the conclusions are misconceived and are influenced by the propaganda of separatists and Pakistan. The following factors in this context merit attention-
-The protests are confined to only some parts of the Valley. Well researched figures available in the media reveal that the violent protests have been witnessed in seven out of ten districts of the Valley and more frequent protests have been noted only in the four districts- Baramulla, Srinagar, Anantnag and Pulwama.
-A section of stone throwers is receiving money to participate in these protests to target the security force personnel. Intelligence reports also reveal that the protesters include a large number of those persons who have taken up stone pelting as a lucrative business. CM Omar Abdullah had noted in April, "The industry of stone pelting is very much on our radar. We have in fact been able to identify a couple of big business houses, one in particular which has used its networks of dealers to route the money through."
-These protests are being organized by separatist leaders at the behest of Pak ISI which had been preparing for this strategy since 2006. The calendar of protests is prepared and issued by the separatists. The adherence to these calls by common people is mainly because of the muscle power of the miniscule separatists and not because of their own conviction. For example, the Lassipora Industrial Estate in Pulwama and Rangreth Industrial Estate were not affected by the protests in the beginning but after the visit of terrorists, the situation changed.
-The cycle of violence suggests a set pattern indicating how carefully these protests are orchestrated. When the street rage begins to peter out in one area, protests erupt in some other region. Home Minister stated on August 4, 2010 that there was a reliable intelligence that at least one armed militant had mingled with the crowds and fired at the security forces. This suggests that the planners are deliberately creating situations in which the security forces are forced to fire.
-Some early signs of people in the Valley getting fed up with the growing number of calls for protests are now visible. On September 4, 2010 residents in Srinagar defied the call for protests and went about their business as usual. Shopkeepers and taxi drivers expressed that as they were suffering financially since mid June because of the frequent calls of protests, hence they decided to defy the separatists' strike call. Towards the end of August, scores of parents and students marched to Srinagar from Ganderbal district carrying placards to protest against the closure of schools and colleges. A leading school in Srinagar was forced to shift its class XII students to New Delhi to salvage their academic year.
Though the separatists' strategy and their Pak mentors' guidance and support form the main cause of the current crisis, yet they do not provide the complete picture. Much blame should also come to the Kashmiri politicians whose lackluster performance and vote bank politics have significantly contributed to the deterioration of the situation in the J&K. Bureaucracy too is responsible for generating frustration among the common people. Corruption is rampant and there is clearly absence of visible development. The officials are not seen as paying due attention to the grievance of residents. Elements of good governance are missing. This strengthens the perception that the administration in the State has collapsed.
The security forces too are not fully trained to deal with the situation that has arisen recently. The perception is growing that the security forces are not adhering to the principle of use of minimum force. Analysts have pointed out that the security forces are not adopting non lethal sophisticated methods for controlling the crowd. The continuing deaths in firings of the security forces strengthen this perception.
The National Conference, which obtained a sizable number of seats in the elections about two years ago, is fast losing its popularity. The PDP has been espousing the cause of separatists and is always looking for an opportunity to oust the present government. A deliberate effort is on to project that the present Chief Minister is not capable of handling the current crisis. Even those elements who are convinced of sincerity of Omar Abdullah, feel that he lacks maturity to deal with the opportunist political leaders in J&K. If violence continues, the ruling government would find it difficult to continue.
The moot question is how to deal with the current cycle of violence.
SAS Geelani has stated that Kashmiris desire only azadi and nothing less than secession of J&K from India would satisfy them. This is not correct as majority of residents of the State do not desire this. It is wrong to presume that all Muslims of the State want azadi. The younger elements are not clear about the concept of azadi as was clear from their interaction with some politicians that was reported in the media. The political leaders both in J&K and in New Delhi stress the need for political solution and to start a dialogue with the separatists. PM has come out with the employment and economic development package. While these are to some extent needed, the policy makers need to accurately assess the causes behind the current violence and protests and the changing nature of demands to undertake appropriate steps to restore normalcy.
The immediate causes should be given priority rather than the long term measures. The present unrest stems out of the perception of "deliberate killings" in the police firings. This has allowed the separatists and the Pak agencies to create a perception that the present regime is supporting the security personnel who are indulging in ruthless human rights violations. Therefore as the first step the perception that the Government tends to bat for the errant elements in the security forces and not for the people of J&K needs to be removed by ordering a probe in all such cases. A judicial commission should be established at the earliest for this purpose. This may certainly adversely affect the morale of the security forces but this would go a long way to satisfy the protesters. The Government must make it clear that the guilty would be suitably punished. The investigations may expose the manipulations by the separatists, which could nullify the allegations against the security forces. Alongside, a mechanism for prompt and satisfactory attention to the complaints of excessive use of force or violation of human rights should be established. There is a feeling among the residents of J&K that there is no effective mechanism to pay attention to their grievances.
The second step should be aimed at starting an interaction with the young men who are involved in the agitation. There has been a lot of pressure to start a dialogue with the separatists. This should be avoided in the present circumstances as under the shadow of protests and continuing violence, it is not likely to succeed. The Government should immediately appoint an interlocutor to start the process of interaction with the agitating youth. The person for this job should be carefully selected. It may be better to appoint a politician who understands the problems of all the sections of J&K. Appointment of a retired bureaucrat should be avoided as they are seen as following the established line. The interlocutor should talk to all sections. The migrants from the Valley should also be consulted and all efforts should be made to bring them back to the Valley.
The third step should be to put in place sophisticated methods of crowd control and avoid the use of lethal weapons. The security forces should keep in mind that increasing number of incidents of killings would make the situation intractable. They should also ensure that no one is ill treated. The PM has already stressed the need for non lethal mechanisms of crowd control. This would also require suitable training of security forces in such methods. The security forces must realize that in situations like this, the emphasis should be on winning over "hearts and minds of the people". Their involvement in providing necessary medical and educational facilities to people particularly in difficult areas would go a long way in earning of their goodwill. The rotation of units of security forces at suitable intervals is also necessary to ensure that the fatigue factor does not adversely affect their decision making capabilities.
The fourth step that the Central Government should take is to energize the Task Force for Psychological Campaign to counter the malicious propaganda of the separatists and the Pak agencies. This was established under the Home Secretary by the Group of Ministers in 2001. However it seldom meets. This should meet at regular intervals to provide necessary guidance to the concerned agencies. This institution can play a significant role in removing the wrong perceptions and media management, which are crucial at this juncture. India has so far been silent as far as the happenings in PoK are concerned. Despite the fact that this area belongs to India, there has been no systematic effort made to project our concerns over denial of democratic rights to people there and deliberate change in the demography of the region by Pakistan that adversely affects the local people. If these facts are brought to the notice of the people in J&K, they would be able to clearly see the game plan of Pakistan. The fact that PoK is ruled like a colony of Pakistan needs to be placed before the people. The residents in Gilgit-Baltistan are already revolting against the Pak governance policy and it is India's moral obligation to support the "freedom fighters" there.
The Hurriyat leaders are not the real leaders of the people of J&K. They have not faced elections. Of course their ability to create mischief is high, which is because of the support of terrorists and not because of their wide spread support. Therefore, they should be treated accordingly. Media has over projected the "willingness" of Geelani to support the dialogue process. He has placed his five pre conditions for talks which only support the Pak line. Any temptation to have a dialogue with the separatists should be avoided with these preconditions though this may receive a pat from the international community. Any dialogue under the shadow of protests and violence is unlikely to yield the desired results.
The political leaders should improve their performance. They must realize that if their performance remains unsatisfactory, people are bound to express their resentment against them. Most of the political leaders have stopped addressing rallies in the Valley since mid-June. The governance needs to be improved significantly. The official machinery should be sensitive to the problems of the people. It may be recalled that in 2006 in the Round Table Conference, the PM had announced people centric initiatives which had positive impact. Their implementation in letter and spirit needs to be pursued.
The proposal to lift the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act should be taken after considering all the facts. This should not be done merely to placate the protesters. While the removal of this Act has become one of the demands of the protesters, it must be recognized that the current anger of the protesters is primarily against the deaths in the firings on the protesters. The infiltration continues and reports suggest that a sizeable number of foreign terrorists are present in J&K. The likely repercussions of the removal of the Act should be accurately assessed. Similarly the impact of reduction of the security forces should be analyzed in the light of the developing situation. However, the relocation of the security pickets in the civilian areas can be undertaken.
The larger question of political initiatives to satisfy the aspirations of the people of J&K should be seen in the wider context of Centre-State Relations. There are several other states which are governed by Special Acts like J&K. If J&K has Art 370, Nagaland has Art.371-A, Assam has Art 371-B, Manipur has Art-371-C, Andhra Pradesh has Art 371-D and there are special provisions for Sikkim, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh and Goa as well. If some concessions are to be given to J&K, similar demands would be made by other States. The Centre- State Commission has dealt with all such aspects in its report. Its recommendations need to be examined for implementation. The need for devolution of power to the lowest administrative unit is certainly desirable. The aspirations of people would be satisfied if they are involved in the decision making bodies at the local levels. This should be done in all the States.
It is necessary to note that there is no quick political solution for the problem. Indian policy makers should not take any political measure in a hurry that would create serious problems for our successive generations.
ABOUT S D PRADHAN
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S D Pradhan has served as chairman of India's Joint Intelligence Committee. He has also been the country's deputy national security adviser. He was chairman of the Task Force on Intelligence Mechanism (2008-2010), which was constituted to review the functioning of the intelligence agencies. He has taught at the departments of defence studies and history at the Punjabi University, Patiala. He was also a visiting professor at the University of Illinois, US, in the department of arms control and disarmament studies. The ministry of defence had utilized his services for the preparation of official accounts of the 1971 war and the counterinsurgency operations in the northeast. In the JIC/National Security Council secretariat, he was closely involved with the preparation of the reports of the Kargil Review Committee and the Group of Ministers on national security as also with the implementation of their recommendations. His publications include two books and several articles.
More
S D Pradhan has served as chairman of India's Joint Intelligence Committee. He has also been the country's deputy national security adviser. He was chairman of the Task Force on Intelligence Mechanism (2008-2010), which was constituted to review the functioning of the intelligence agencies. He has taught at the departments of defence studies and history at the Punjabi University, Patiala. He was also a visiting professor at the University of Illinois, US, in the department of arms control and disarmament studies. The ministry of defence had utilized his services for the preparation of official accounts of the 1971 war and the counterinsurgency operations in the northeast. In the JIC/National Security Council secretariat, he was closely involved with the preparation of the reports of the Kargil Review Committee and the Group of Ministers on national security as also with the implementation of their recommendations. His publications include two books and several articles.
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